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DescriptionKant and Skepticism (Princeton Monographs in Philosophy) by Michael N. Forster (Author)  {BinanGotit} Product details Hardcover: 168 pages Publisher: Princeton University Press (23rd January 2008) Language: English ISBN-10: 0691129878 ISBN-13: 978-0691129877 This book puts forward a much-needed reappraisal of Immanuel Kant's conception of and response to skepticism, as set forth principally in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is widely recognized that Kant's theoretical philosophy aims to answer skepticism and reform metaphysics--Michael Forster makes the controversial argument that those aims are closely linked. He distinguishes among three types of skepticism: "veil of perception" skepticism, which concerns the external world; Humean skepticism, which concerns the existence of a priori concepts and synthetic a priori knowledge; and Pyrrhonian skepticism, which concerns the equal balance of opposing arguments. Forster overturns conventional views by showing how the first of these types was of little importance for Kant, but how the second and third held very special importance for him, namely because of their bearing on the fate of metaphysics. He argues that Kant undertook his reform of metaphysics primarily in order to render it defensible against these types of skepticism. Finally, in a critical appraisal of Kant's project, Forster argues that, despite its strengths, it ultimately fails, for reasons that carry interesting broader philosophical lessons. These reasons include inadequate self-reflection and an underestimation of the resources of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Review "In this precise, lively work, Forster establishes the significance of skepticism in the motivation, development, and formulation of Kant's thought. He examines three varieties of skepticism: 'veil of perception skepticism' concerning the external world, which he interprets as secondary for Kant despite its priority in previous literature; 'Humean skepticism' concerning the possibility of a priori knowledge; and 'Pyrrhonian skepticism,' employing a 'zetetic method' of equipollence and antinomies in order to suspend judgment. . . . Forster concludes, however, that Kant's reliance on transcendental arguments and transcendental idealism reintroduces the skeptical problems they were meant to resolve through inadequate self-reflection and radical skepticism revenge on Kant's incorporation of its moderate variant."--E. S. Nelson, University of Massachusetts Lowell, for CHOICE.  Sharing Widget |