[William M. LeoGrande ,Peter Kornbluh]Back Channel to Cuba The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana(pdf){Zzzzz}

Product Description
Challenging the conventional wisdom of perpetual hostility between the United States and Cuba--beyond invasions, covert operations, assassination plots using poison pens and exploding seashells, and a grinding economic embargo--this fascinating book chronicles a surprising, untold history of bilateral efforts toward rapprochement and reconciliation. Since 1959, conflict and aggression have dominated the story of U.S.-Cuban relations. Now, William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh present a new and increasingly more relevant account. From John F. Kennedy's offering of an olive branch to Fidel Castro after the missile crisis, to Henry Kissinger's top secret quest for normalization, to Barack Obama's promise of a "new approach," LeoGrande and Kornbluh reveal a fifty-year record of dialogue and negotiations, both open and furtive, indicating a path toward better relations in the future.

LeoGrande and Kornbluh have uncovered hundreds of formerly secret U.S. documents and conducted interviews with dozens of negotiators, intermediaries, and policy makers, including Fidel Castro and Jimmy Carter. The authors describe how, despite the political clamor surrounding any hint of better relations with Havana, serious negotiations have been conducted by every presidential administration since Eisenhower's through secret, back-channel diplomacy. Concluding with ten lessons for U.S. negotiators, the book offers an important perspective on current political debates, at a time when leaders of both nations have publicly declared the urgency of moving beyond the legacy of hostility.

Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press; 1 edition (1 October 2014)
Sold by: Amazon Digital Services, Inc.
Language: English
ASIN: B00N5YYUEK

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

Insights into How Foreign Policy Really Works 3 October 2014
By ernest schusky -
From Eisenhower to Obama, Presidents have used informal, highly secretive communications to determine relations between Cuba and the United States. Most experts have known this practice has existed, but LeoGrande and Kornbluh document its extent to such lengths that even the most informed will be shocked. The two authors rely heavily upon freedom of information access, but they have also interviewed many of the participants. The most shocking of their revelations is that Henry Kissinger, who initially proposed further openings to Cuba because of Nixon's success with China, was so enraged that Cuba sent forces to Africa, that he encouraged planning to invade Cuba. Moreover, he won Gerald Ford's approval for such an adventure. The authors suggest that only the election of Jimmy Carter prevented a debacle.
Although other attempts at establishing relations to Cuba are not so shocking, they will give readers insight into how Fidel Castro and his brother have made life so difficult for American Presidents who must always factor in the Cuban vote with what they would like to do internationally. Most Presidents, the book shows, hoped to have a better relation with the island, but just as they anticipated an opening to normalization some small event, such as the kidnapping of a divorced couple's child, set back any possible improvement.
This remarkable book focuses on the lack of transparency in relations with Cuba, but it also indicates how secretive U.S. diplomacy must be generally. A must read for anyone itnerested in foreigh relations.

I was pleased to have been a small part of their exposition ... 11 October 2014
By Kirby Jones -
So many books about Cuba have been written, but none are as absorbing and informational as this book by LeoGrande and Kornbluh. I was pleased to have been a small part of their exposition of the various and many secret talks between Cuba and the U.S. Since I first visited Cuba in 1974 to interview Fidel and was witness to a message to Fidel from Kissinger, I am struck by how little has changed after all these years and after all these attempts. The Cubans have displayed immense patience while the U.S. has - time and time again - revealed that they never understood the Cuban character, never placed themselves in Cuba's position, and repeatedly cut off talks when Cuba did not do as they said or expected. And then the U.S. wondered why Cuba didn't accept when all the U.S. was demanding was for Cuba to change its entire political and economic system. And it is still demanding that of Cuba today despite 50 years. Bits and pieces of what the authors recount starting with Eisenhower have dribbled out but when they put them all in one place - this book - they take on a pattern and illumination. A fantastic book which will educate the expert or the casual observer.