[Y.B.K] India Bhopal Gas Tragedy_Disaster Hindi Documentary - भोपाल गैस त्रासदी.mp4

India Bhopal Gas Tragedy_Disaster Hindi Documentary - भोपाल गैस त्रासदी





Bhopal disaster
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Bhopal disaster Bhopal-Union Carbide 1 crop memorial.jpg
Memorial by Dutch artist Ruth Kupferschmidt for those killed and disabled by the 1984 toxic gas release
Date 2 December 1984–3 December 1984
Location Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh
Coordinates 23°16′51″N 77°24′38″ECoordinates: 23°16′51″N 77°24′38″E
Also known as Bhopal gas tragedy
Cause Methyl Isocyanate leak from Union Carbide India Limited storage tank
Deaths At least 3,787; over 16,000 claimed
Non-fatal injuries At least 558,125

The Bhopal disaster, also referred to as the Bhopal gas tragedy, was a gas leak incident in India, considered the world's worst industrial disaster.[1]

It occurred on the night of 2–3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Over 500,000 people were exposed to methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and other chemicals. The toxic substance made its way into and around the shanty towns located near the plant.[2]

Estimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was 2,259. The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release.[3] A government affidavit in 2006 stated that the leak caused 558,125 injuries, including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.[4] Others estimate that 8,000 died within two weeks, and another 8,000 or more have since died from gas-related diseases.[5]

The cause of the disaster remains under debate. The Indian government and local activists argue that slack management and deferred maintenance created a situation where routine pipe maintenance caused a backflow of water into a MIC tank triggering the disaster. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) contends water entered the tank through an act of sabotage.

The owner of the factory, UCIL, was majority owned by UCC, with Indian Government-controlled banks and the Indian public holding a 49.1 percent stake. In 1989, UCC paid $470m ($907m in 2014 dollars) to settle litigation stemming from the disaster. In 1994, UCC sold its stake in UCIL to Eveready Industries India Limited (EIIL), which subsequently merged with McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. Eveready ended clean-up on the site in 1998, when it terminated its 99-year lease and turned over control of the site to the state government of Madhya Pradesh. Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC in 2001, seventeen years after the disaster.

Civil and criminal cases were filed in the District Court of Bhopal, India, involving UCC and Warren Anderson, UCC CEO at the time of the disaster.[6][7] In June 2010, seven ex-employees, including the former UCIL chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of about $2,000 each, the maximum punishment allowed by Indian law. An eighth former employee was also convicted, but died before the judgement was passed.[1] Anderson died on September 29, 2014.

Contents

1 The pre-event phase
1.1 Earlier leaks
2 The leakage and its subsequent effects
2.1 Liquid MIC storage
2.2 The release
2.3 Acute effects
2.4 Gas cloud composition
2.4.1 Immediate aftermath
2.5 Subsequent legal action
2.6 Post-settlement activity
3 Long-term effects
3.1 Long-term health effects
3.2 Health care
3.3 Environmental rehabilitation
3.4 Occupational and habitation rehabilitation
3.5 Economic rehabilitation
3.6 Other impacts
4 Causes of the disaster: overview
4.1 Causes of the disaster: The "corporate negligence" argument
4.2 Causes of the disaster: the "disgruntled employee sabotage" case
4.3 The argument for sabotage
5 Additional Union Carbide actions
5.1 Charges against UCC and UCIL employees
6 Ongoing contamination
7 Fiction
8 Activism
8.1 Local activism
8.2 International activism
8.3 Activist organisations
8.4 Settlement fund hoax
8.5 Monitoring of Bhopal activists
9 See also
10 Citations
11 References
11.1 Union Carbide Corporation
12 External links

The pre-event phase

The UCIL factory was built in 1969 to produce the pesticide Sevin (UCC's brand name for carbaryl) using methyl isocyanate (MIC) as an intermediate.[5] A MIC production plant was added in 1979.[8][9][10] After the Bhopal plant was built, other manufacturers, including Bayer, produced carbaryl without MIC, though at a greater manufacturing cost. Bayer also used the UCC process at the chemical plant once owned by UCC at Institute, West Virginia, in the United States.[11][12]

The chemical process employed in the Bhopal plant had methylamine reacting with phosgene to form MIC, which was then reacted with 1-naphthol to form the final product, carbaryl. This "route" differed from the MIC-free routes used elsewhere, in which the same raw materials were combined in a different manufacturing order, with phosgene first reacting with naphthol to form a chloroformate ester, which was then reacted with methylamine. In the early 1980s, the demand for pesticides had fallen, but production continued, leading to build-up of stores of unused MIC.[5][11]
Earlier leaks

In 1976, two trade unions complained of pollution within the plant.[5][13] In 1981, a worker was splashed with phosgene. In a panic, he removed his mask, inhaling a large amount of phosgene gas which resulted in his death 72 hours later.[5][13] Local Indian authorities had warned the company of the problem as early as 1979, but constructive actions were not undertaken by UCIL at that time.[5][11] In January 1982, a phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were admitted to a hospital. None of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks. One month later, in February 1982, a MIC leak affected 18 workers. In August 1982, a chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30 percent of his body. Later that same year, in October 1982, there was another MIC leak. In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases. During 1983 and 1984, there were leaks of MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.[5][13]
The leakage and its subsequent effects
Liquid MIC storage

The Bhopal UCIL facility housed three underground 15000 gallon liquid MIC storage tanks: E610, E611, and E619. In the months leading up to the December leak, liquid MIC production was in progress and being used to fill these tanks. UCC safety regulations specified that no one tank should be filled more than 50% (here, 30 tons) with liquid MIC. Each tank was pressurized with inert nitrogen gas. This pressurization allowed liquid MIC to be pumped out of each tank as needed, and also kept impurities out of the tanks.[14]

In late October 1984, tank E610 lost the ability to hold most of its nitrogen gas pressure. It meant that the liquid MIC contained within could not be pumped out. At the time of this failure, tank E610 contained 42 tons of liquid MIC.[14][15] Shortly after this failure, MIC production was halted at the Bhopal facility, and parts of the plant were shut down for maintenance. Maintenance included the shutdown of the plant's flare tower so that a corroded pipe could be repaired.[14] With the flare tower still out of service, production of carboryl was resumed in late November, using MIC stored in the two tanks still in service. An attempt to re-establish pressure in tank E610 on 1 December failed, so the 42 tons of liquid MIC contained within still could not be pumped out of it.[15]
The release
Tank 610 in 2010. During decontamination of the plant, tank 610 was removed from its foundation and left aside
Methylamine (1) reacts with phosgene (2) producing methyl isocyanate (3) which reacts with 1-naphthol (4) to yield carbaryl (5)

In early December 1984, most of the plant's MIC related safety systems were not functioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. In addition, several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes.[5] During the late evening hours of 2 December 1984, water entered a side pipe that was missing its slip-blind plate and entered Tank E610, which still contained 42 tons of MIC, which had been there since late October.[5]

Introduction of water into the tank began a runaway exothermic reaction, which was accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures and other factors, such as the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines.[5] The pressure in tank E610, normal at 10:30 p.m., had increased by a factor of five to 10 psi by 11 p.m. Two different senior refinery employees assumed the reading was instrumentation malfunction.[16] By 11:30 p.m., workers in the MIC area were feeling the effects of minor exposure to MIC gas, and began to look for a leak. One was found by 11:45 p.m., and reported to the MIC supervisor on duty at the time. The decision was made to address the problem after a 12:15 a.m. tea break, and in the meantime, employees were instructed to continue looking for leaks. The leak was discussed by MIC area employees during the break.[16]

In the five minutes after the tea break ended at 12:40 a.m., the reaction in tank E610 quickly reached a critical state. Temperatures in the tank were indicated off its scale, maxed out beyond 25 °C (77 °F), and the pressure in the tank was indicated at 40 psi. One employee witnessed a concrete slab above tank E610 crack as the emergency relief valve burst open, and pressure in the tank continued to increase to 55 psi even after atmospheric venting of toxic MIC gas had begun.[16] Direct atmospheric venting should have been prevented or at least partially mitigated by at least three safety devices which were not working properly, not in use, or insufficiently sized:[17][18]

A refrigeration system meant to cool tanks containing liquid MIC, shut down in January 1982, and whose freon had been removed in June 1984. Since the MIC storage system assumed refrigeration, its high temperature alarm, set to sound at 11 °C (52 °F) had long since been disconnected, and tank storage temperatures ranged between 15 °C (59 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F) .[19]
A flare tower, to burn the MIC gas as it escaped, which had had a connecting pipe removed for maintenance, and was improperly sized to deal with a leak of the size produced by tank E610
A vent gas scrubber, which had been turned off at the time and was in 'standby' mode, and had insufficient caustic soda and power to deal with a leak of the magnitude produced

About 30 metric tons of MIC escaped from the tank into the atmosphere in 45 to 60 minutes.[2] This would increase to 40 metric tons within two hours time.[20] The gases were blown in a southeasterly direction over Bhopal.[5][21]

A UCIL employee triggered the plant's alarm system at 12:50 a.m. as the concentration of gas in and around the plant became difficult to tolerate.[16][20] Activation of the system triggered two siren alarms: one that sounded inside the UCIL plant, and a second directed outward to the public and the city of Bhopal. The two siren systems had been decoupled from one another in 1982, so that it was possible to leave the factory warning siren on while turning off the public one, and this is exactly what was done: the public siren briefly sounded at 12:50 a.m. and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public around the factory over tiny leaks.[20][22][23] Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant, travelling upwind.

Bhopal's superintendent of police was informed by telephone, by a town inspector, that residents of the neighbourhood of Chola (about 2 km from the plant) were fleeing a gas leak at approximately 1 a.m.[22] Calls to the UCIL plant by police between 1:25 and 2:10 a.m. gave assurances twice that "everything is OK", and on the last attempt made, "we don't know what has happened, sir".[22] With the lack of timely information exchange between UCIL and Bhopal authorities, the city's Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas leak was suspected to be ammonia, then phosgene. They were then told that it was "MIC", which hospital staff had never heard of, had no antidote for, and received no immediate information about.[24]

The MIC gas leak emanating from tank E610 petered out at approximately 2:00 a.m. Fifteen minutes later, the plant's public siren was sounded for an extended period of time, after first having been quickly silenced an hour and a half earlier.[25] Some minutes after the public siren sounded, a UCIL employee walked to a police control room to both inform them of the leak (their first acknowledgement that one had occurred at all), and that "the leak had been plugged".[25] Most city residents who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself, or by opening their doors to investigate commotion, rather than having been instructed to shelter in place, or to evacuate before the arrival of the gas in the first place.[23]
Acute effects
Reversible reaction of glutathione (top) with methyl isocyanate (MIC, middle) allows the MIC to be transported into the body

The initial effects of exposure were coughing, severe eye irritation and a feeling of suffocation, burning in the respiratory tract, blepharospasm, breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting. People awakened by these symptoms fled away from the plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to ride. Owing to their height, children and other people of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations.

Thousands of people had died by the following morning.

Primary causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotising enteritis.[26] The stillbirth rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate by around 200%.[5]
Gas cloud composition

As of 2008, UCC had not released information about the possible composition of the cloud. Apart from MIC, the gas cloud may have contained phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, carbon monoxide, hydrogen chloride, oxides of nitrogen, monomethyl amine and carbon dioxide, either produced in the storage tank or in the atmosphere. As the gas cloud was composed mainly of materials denser than the surrounding air, it stayed close to the ground and spread outwards through the surrounding community.[5] The chemical reactions may have produced a liquid or solid aerosol.[27] Laboratory investigations by CSIR and UCC scientists failed to demonstrate the presence of hydrogen cyanide.[28][29]
Immediate aftermath

In the immediate aftermath, the plant was closed to outsiders (including UCC) by the Indian government, which subsequently failed to make data public, contributing to the confusion. The initial investigation was conducted entirely by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Central Bureau of Investigation. The UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson, together with a technical team, immediately traveled to India. Upon arrival Anderson was placed under house arrest and urged by the Indian government to leave the country within 24 hours. Union Carbide organized a team of international medical experts, as well as supplies and equipment, to work with the local Bhopal medical community, and the UCC technical team began assessing the cause of the gas leak.

The health care system immediately became overloaded. In the severely affected areas, nearly 70 percent were under-qualified doctors. Medical staff were unprepared for the thousands of casualties. Doctors and hospitals were not aware of proper treatment methods for MIC gas inhalation.[5]:6
The image of a deceased female child, victim of the Bhopal MIC gas leak
Bhopal gas disaster girl, the burial of one iconic victim of the gas leak (4 December 1984)

There were mass funerals and cremations. Photographer Pablo B